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This paper examines the effects of ﬁrm-level innovation in carbon-abatement
technologies on optimal cap-and-trade schemes with and without price controls. We
characterize optimal cap-and-trade regulation with a price cap and a price ﬂoor, and
compare it to the special cases of pure taxation and a simple emissions cap. Innovation
shifts the tradeoff between price- and quantity-based instruments towards quantity-
based emissions trading schemes. More speciﬁcally, an increase in innovation
effectiveness lowers the optimal emissions cap, and leads to relaxed price controls
unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage curve is small. Because of the
decrease in the emissions cap, innovation in abatement technologies can lead to a
higher expected carbon price, so as to provide sufﬁcient incentives for private R&D
investments. The expected carbon price decreases once innovative technologies are
widely used.
& 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In order to limit global warming, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that worldwide annual
carbon emissions need to be cut approximately in half by 2050 [24]. A mix of different policy instruments is likely to be
required to deliver the necessary emissions reductions, including a price for carbon, incentives for technological innovation, and
suitable administrative procedures [55]. We focus on the ﬁrst two by exploring the impact of price- and quantity-control
instruments on both emissions-abatement efforts and private investment in the improvement of abatement technologies. For
this, we construct optimal cap-and-trade schemes with price controls (of which pure taxation and standard cap-and-trade are
special cases) and examine how a change in innovation effectiveness inﬂuences the design of policy instruments. We ﬁnd that
an increase in innovation effectiveness can, somewhat counter-intuitively, lead to higher carbon prices. This stems from the fact
that in order to encourage technological innovation, the welfare-maximizing regulator may choose to aggressively decrease the
emissions cap, leading to a higher expected carbon price despite the anticipated decrease in abatement cost. Because of an
increase in carbon-price volatility from an emissions cap, which encourages innovation, a higher innovation effectiveness favors
quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments. In the case of hybrid schemes, an increased innovation effectiveness
leads to looser price controls (i.e., lower price ﬂoor and higher price cap), unless the slope of the marginal environmental
damage curve is small, in which case an inverse result obtains.
There are three main reasons for a simultaneous consideration of several regulatory instruments.1 First, a joint optimization
of several instruments (prices and quantities) cannot do worse than optimizing any policy instrument individually [49,61].ll rights reserved.
er), kneuhoff@diw.de (K. Neuhoff).
trade markets, such as the increased design complexity, commitment problems, political inﬂuence
lobbying activities, as are already the number of emissions permits as well as the mode of the initial
lities of different designs across countries (cf. Section 4).
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single policy instrument clearly dominates the others [14,41,53]. Third, the regulatory policy needs to inﬂuence multiple
decisions, in our case, the capital investment in innovation as well as the decision about emissions (output) [12,25,33]. In terms
of results, we characterize the optimal policy, a cap-and-trade scheme with price controls (in the form of price cap and price
ﬂoor), and contrast it to the classical schemes of pure taxation and cap-and-trade without price controls, with respect to
performance and the ﬁrms’ incentives to abate and innovate. Tight price controls limit the ﬁrms’ exposure to risk on the market.
On the other hand, they tend to increase the variability of aggregate emissions, thus augmenting the volatility of environmental
damages. This in turn leads to higher expected damages, as long as the damage function is convex in aggregate emissions. While
the ﬁrms’ innovation becomes more effective, it is always optimal to set a more ambitious, lower emissions cap; optimal price
controls tighten only when the slope of the marginal environmental damage curve (per unit of emissions) is small. When the
slope of marginal environmental damages is large, then it is best for a regulator to relax price controls (i.e., drop the price ﬂoor
and raise the price cap) in response to an increase in the ﬁrms’ innovation effectiveness. While at ﬁrst glance this appears to be
a contradiction toWeitzman’s [60] seminal analysis of ‘prices vs. quantities,’ which predicts—in the absence of innovation—less
stringent price controls as a consequence of an increase in marginal environmental damages, the same tradeoff prevails at any
ﬁxed level of innovation effectiveness. This, together with the fact that price controls are relaxed when innovation effectiveness
increases and environmental damages are large, implies that the sensitivity of the price controls to the general carbon-price
level increases substantially as innovation effectiveness increases. The heightened sensitivity underlines the necessity to
consider all available instruments and relevant effects jointly, as welfare losses are compounded in the presence of additional
uncertainty about macroeconomic conditions, innovation costs, or environmental damages.
In the scientiﬁc community, a consensus has emerged that climate change and carbon emissions from man’s economic
activity are intertwined, and that they need to be addressed simultaneously [40]. The economic activity considered here
includes two decisions taken by ﬁrms: ﬁrst, how much carbon (dioxide) to emit (‘emissions control’), and, second, how
much to invest in improving carbon-abatement technologies (‘technological innovation’).
Emissions control: A Pigouvian tax [47] corrects a distortion generated by the lack of a price for the expected
environmental damages through carbon (or ‘carbon-equivalent’) emissions [44], unlike many other modes of input
taxation which lead to deadweight losses [1]. An alternative course of action for governments, initially suggested by Coase,
is to issue tradable emissions permits [5–7,36]. Such quantity-based regulation is sometimes viewed as inferior on the
grounds of signiﬁcant transaction costs [53], given that an administrative system for levying tax is usually available. In the
absence of transaction-cost considerations, the optimal choice between tax or quantity-based allowance-trading scheme
depends on the nature of the uncertainty [60],2 since environmental damages are typically modelled as a convex function
of aggregate emissions, an increase in risk [50] increases expected damages (as a consequence of Jensen’s inequality),
which in turn favors quantity-based regulation. If, on the other hand, the loss in society’s payoffs due to uncertainty in
emissions and resulting expected environmental damages are small compared to the loss due to randomness in market
prices, then an emissions tax is preferred, as it eliminates price uncertainty. Naturally, as Weitzman [61] shows, a
combination of price and quantity regulation cannot do worse than either policy instrument alone. In Weitzman’s
treatment a price-quota system determines a socially optimal reward as a function of its emissions for each participating
ﬁrm. In real-world settings, it is impossible to implement such inﬁnite-dimensional policies (in the form of reward
functions) using simple cap-and-trade. Yet, a ﬁrst approximation, which still combines the features of pure taxation and a
simple cap-and-trade system, is a market for emissions allowances with price controls: an emissions cap controls total
emissions and determines the initial number of permits to be issued. As long as the resulting market price for emissions is
within pre-speciﬁed price bounds, this results in a normal cap-and-trade system. If the carbon price reaches the pre-
speciﬁed maximum price (price cap), additional permits are issued [30,48,49]). The price ﬂoor can be implemented with a
reservation price for allowance auctions [18], by governments issuing option contracts on the carbon price as a
commitment to buy back permits when the carbon price drops below the price ﬂoor. More recently, Philibert [46] uses
extensive Monte-Carlo simulations to study the effect of price caps and price ﬂoors on climate policy. The simulation
results conﬁrm that price controls, while increasing expected environmental damage, dampen expected aggregate
abatement costs. To this we add a simpliﬁed formal framework and an analysis of the interaction with innovation.
Technological innovation: The introduction of a carbon price via incentive-based emissions-control policies is, according
to Hicks’ ([19], p. 132) ‘induced invention hypothesis,’ likely to affect the rate and path of technological change. This
hypothesis sparked not only a stream of research attempting to formally establish this effect in general-equilibrium
models [26,59], but also several severe criticisms related to the description of knowledge accumulation [39,51], producing
a hiatus of results. Recent surveys on technological change in economic models of environmental policy emphasize the
need to consider innovation as an endogenous decision variable rather than an exogenous process [9,29]. Milliman and
Prince [33] consider three phases of technological change: innovation, diffusion, and agency response. They ﬁnd that either
a tax or a system with auctioned carbon permits dominates regimes with free permits or imposed technological standards
in view of promoting technological change at the ﬁrm level. Building on this work, Jung et al. [25] obtain similar ﬁndings at
the industry level; in particular, they show that ﬁrm-speciﬁc standards are dominated by quantity-based policy2 Various generalizations of Weitzman’s [60] analysis have been proposed, such as for situations with asymmetric information between regulator and
ﬁrms [21,27], correlated uncertainty [54], hybrid price-quantity controls [49,61], incomplete enforcement [35], and bankable permits [11].
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reduced market price for carbon.3 As most of the subsequent literature, we therefore restrict our attention to incentive-
based policy instruments. Using a model with a linear environmental damage function and in the absence of uncertainty or
ﬁrm heterogeneity, Parry [42] ﬁnds that tax and (either free or auctioned) emissions permits have similar efﬁciency
properties.4 Parry points out that ‘R&D efﬁciency gains’ may arise because ﬁrms fail to take into account the positive
externalities associated with technology spillover and environmental-damage reduction. With a convex environmental
damage cost function but in the absence of uncertainty, Denicol o [8] demonstrates that, without commitment, taxes and
cap-and-trade result in the same carbon price with identical welfare properties and incentives to innovate (for a single
innovation leader), whereas, with commitment, taxes provide better marginal incentives for innovation and dominate in
terms of welfare. In a similar setting, Fischer et al. [12] show that when the spillover effect is large (decreasing the
appropriability of innovation) auctioned permits lead to higher welfare gains than taxes. Yet, Fischer et al. note that neither
instrument clearly dominates the other, which highlights the potential beneﬁts from combining price-based and quantity-
based regulation in a cap-and-trade regime with price controls. In the terminology of these earlier studies, our model
concentrates on innovation as the ﬁrst phase of technological change, with spillover effects (i.e., the second phase) in our
model being isomorphic to a shift in innovation effectiveness. The agency response (i.e., the third phase) to innovation is
restricted to the ﬁrst period where the regulator commits to a certain regulatory regime.5 Our model extends earlier work
in several ways: ﬁrst, it allows for macroeconomic uncertainty, preserving the Weitzman tradeoff between prices and
quantities. Second, it incorporates both quantity-based and price-based instruments, which leads to optimality of a hybrid
scheme. Third, it features ex-ante ﬁrm heterogeneity in the ability to abate carbon. In our model, we assume that there is a
continuous set of different technologies without technology spillover.
2. The model
We consider a unit mass of ﬁrms, indexed by y 2Y  Rþ þ , and distributed on the (measurable) type spaceY with the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F : Y-½0,1, so that the mean
m¼
Z
Y
ydFðyÞ,
and the variance
s2y ¼
Z
Y
ðymÞ2 dFðyÞ,
both exist and are ﬁnite. The model timing consists of three time periods (stages), indexed by t 2 f0,1,2g. At time t=0
(regulation stage), a regulator commits to a regulatory policy R=(E,L,U) by announcing an emissions cap E, a price ﬂoor L,
and a price cap U. In particular, the regulator may choose pure taxation or a cap-and-trade scheme without price controls.6
At time t=1 (innovation stage), any ﬁrm has the option to invest in innovation, which may reduce its cost of carbon
abatement in the future. Finally, at time t=2 (implementation stage), each ﬁrm y 2 Y chooses its carbon emissions level. We
now describe each of the three stages in detail, starting with the last.
Implementation stage (t=2): Without any price on carbon or other output restrictions, ﬁrm y expects to produce its
business-as-usual (BAU) carbon emissions of e0ðyÞ. The actual BAU carbon emissions for ﬁrm y are subject to a
macroeconomic random shock ~e. The latter is common to all ﬁrms and has cdf G : R-½0,1, with E~e ¼ 0 and
0oE~e2 ¼ s2eo1.7 Given a realized BAU carbon emissions level e^0 ¼ e0ðyÞþe, ﬁrm y’s cost of abating its carbon emissions
to a level er e^0 is
Cðe,r^yje^0Þ ¼
ðe^0eÞ2
2r^y
, ð1Þ
where r^Z1 denotes the outcome of the ﬁrm’s investment in the preceding innovation stage, further detailed below. All
else being equal, the larger the ﬁrm’s type y, the smaller its marginal abatement cost ðe^0eÞ=ðr^yÞ.8 Given a price p for each3 Fischer et al. [12] call these two principal sources of private gains from innovation the ‘abatement cost effect’ and the ‘emissions payment effect,’
respectively.
4 In our model we assume that CO2 allowances are auctioned off and therefore that ﬁrms bear the full cost of a carbon price. For example, this is the
current objective of the EU emissions trading scheme. If free allocation reduces ﬁrms’ cost of allowances, it also reduces the incentives to innovate [33].
Administrative procedures associated with the detailed allocation provisions can further distort incentives for innovation [16].
5 For example, in terms of agency response, Goulder and Mathai [13] show that induced technological change leads to a lower carbon tax.
6 In Section 3, these important special cases are examined separately.
7 It is possible to allow for independent ﬁrm-speciﬁc (idiosyncratic) zero-mean random shocks ~eðyÞ with ﬁnite variances satisfying a Lindeberg
condition, which complicates the presentation and, via the central limit theorem, leads to an equivalent result.
8 The afﬁne form of the marginal abatement cost is chosen as in [61], so as to obtain explicit model results. More generally, marginal abatement costs
are convex and decrease to zero as the emissions level approaches the ﬁrm’s BAU level [34]. Enkvist et al. [10] use data to ﬁnd an approximately afﬁne
marginal abatement-cost curve. They also note that marginal abatement cost may become negative for small levels of abatement, as small emissions
improvements could be implemented at a gain to a ﬁrm. In our model we assume that all such gains have been internalized, so that the marginal
abatement cost at the ﬁrm’s realized BAU emissions level vanishes.
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9 and here denoted by tCO2
for simplicity), the ﬁrm’s total cost of producing at the emissions level e is
TCðe,p,r^yje^0Þ ¼ Cðe,r^yje^0Þþpe:
The ﬁrm’s optimal emissions minimize its total cost, and is uniquely determined by10
eðp,r^yje^0Þ ¼ e^0r^yp: ð2Þ
At this output level, the ﬁrm’s optimal total carbon emissions cost is
TCðp,r^yje^0Þ ¼ e^0p
r^yp2
2
:
Innovation stage (t=1): Given the announcement of a carbon pricing policy, each ﬁrm y chooses the level y of innovative
activity. The cost of pursuing the innovative activity K(y) is known, but the outcome of the innovation ~rðyÞ is uncertain. The
innovation provides an advantage over the existing technology if and only if ~rðyÞ41. Only in this case will it be utilized.
We assume that the expected outcome of innovation for a certain level of innovative activity y is11
y¼ E½maxf ~rðyÞ,1gjy1Z0: ð3Þ
Firm y’s expected net payoff from innovating is
pðp,y,yÞ ¼ yyp
2
2
KðyÞ:
Assuming that K(y) is a continuously differentiable, convex, and increasing function (satisfying the Inada conditions
Kð0Þ ¼ K 0ð0Þ ¼ 0 and K 0ð1Þ ¼1), the optimal innovation is determined by the ﬁrst-order optimality condition yp2=2¼ K 0ðyÞ.
If we assume, for the sake of discussion, that
KðyÞ ¼ cy2=2,
where c is a positive constant, ﬁrm y’s optimal innovation becomes
yðp,yÞ ¼ yp
2
2c
, ð4Þ
resulting in an expected net payoff of
pðp,yÞ ¼ y
2p4
8c
: ð5Þ
Thus, the beneﬁts of improving abatement technologies are highly sensitive to the carbon price. Nonetheless, the expected
payoff of optimal innovation is positive, as long as small improvements are cheap (since K 0ð0Þ ¼ 0).12
Regulation stage (t=0): The regulator commits to a (deterministic) regulatory policy
R¼ ðE,L,UÞ
consisting of an emissions cap E (implemented by issuing a set quantity of emissions permits), and a price interval [L,U] for
the secondary market in emissions permits. In the event the market price p reaches the price ﬂoor L, the regulator offers
ﬁrms to buy back emissions permits at the price L. If the market price p reaches the price cap U, the regulator offers ﬁrms
additional permits at the price U.
Remark 1. (i) A pure carbon tax t can be implemented by choosing R¼ ðE,t,tÞ, where EZ0 is arbitrary, since the carbon
market is bypassed by the regulator, who offers an ex-ante unlimited number of carbon emissions permits at the ﬁxed
price of t. (ii) A pure carbon emissions cap of E is also a special case, which can be implemented by setting R¼ ðE,0,1Þ,
effectively disabling the price controls with L=0 and U ¼1.
The set of feasible regulatory policies is
R¼ fðE,L,UÞ 2 R3þ : LrUg:9 One ton of carbon-dioxide equivalent (denoted by tCO2eq) is the weight of a greenhouse gas which would have the same time-integrated radiative
forcing (over a period of 100 years) as one ton of CO2.
10 In principle it is possible to obtain negative values for optimal carbon emissions, which implies that the ﬁrm would substitute its production
further away from carbon than its zero-carbon emissions normalization would indicate. Alternatively, the ﬁrm can accumulate carbon credits. The
unconstrained optimization also simpliﬁes the model in that the expected level of aggregate emissions with macroeconomic uncertainty corresponds to
the aggregate emissions level in the absence of this uncertainty (‘certainty equivalence’). Relaxing this condition would impact modelling results only
marginally, and would also raise the additional question of the precise measurement of the absolute level of BAU emissions.
11 This is without any loss in generality, as for any arbitrary parametrization of the innovative process ~rðxÞ in terms of x, one can simply set y equal to
vðxÞ  E½maxf ~rðxÞ,1gjx1 and then reparametrize the innovative process in terms of x^ ¼ ðx^0 ,xÞ which contains x^0 ¼ y¼ vðxÞ as one component.
12 Enkvist et al. [10] argue that the cost of abating the ﬁrst units of carbon emissions, net of beneﬁts, may on average be negative. The assumption
that K 0ð0Þ ¼ 0 implies that any ﬁrm’s BAU emissions are set to the level at which it has internalized any such abatement beneﬁts.
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yields (using Eqs. (2)–(4)) the expected aggregate carbon emissions
Q ðp,eÞ ¼
Z
Y
eðp,ð1þyðp,yÞÞyje0ðyÞþeÞdFðyÞ ¼ e0þemp
m2þs2y
2c
p3, ð6Þ
where we denote by
e0 ¼
Z
Y
e0ðyÞdFðyÞ
the expected aggregate BAU emissions in the economy. To understand the integral in Eq. (6), note ﬁrst that by Eq. (3) a ﬁrm
of cost type y, when investing in technology at the optimal innovation level yðp,yÞ, expects to transition to the improved
cost type y^ ¼ ð1þyðp,yÞÞy. Substituting Eqs. (2) and (4) in the integrand, the right-hand side of Eq. (6) obtains via
straightforward integration. To clarify the inﬂuence of innovation, aggregate emissions can be rewritten in the form
Q ðp,eÞ ¼ e0þempð1þbp2Þ, ð7Þ
where, with k¼ sy=m as the coefﬁcient of variation of the cost-type distribution,
b¼ m
2þs2y
2mc ¼
m
2c
ð1þk2Þ ð8Þ
denotes the (aggregate) innovation effectiveness.13 It is possible to understand the deﬁnition of the innovation effectiveness
b starting from Eq. (7). For this, let Q0 denote the aggregate emissions in the absence of innovation (i.e., when c-1 or,
equivalently, b¼ 0). Further, let A0 ¼ mp be the abatement without innovation ðb¼ 0Þ, and A = A0 + AI be the abatement
with innovation ðb40Þ. Then from Eq. (7) we obtain that
Q0Q
A0
¼ e0A0ðe0A0AIÞ
A0
¼ AI
A0
¼ bp2,
where e0 is the business-as-usual aggregate emissions level. Thus, the innovation effectiveness,
b¼ 1
p2
AI
A0
is for a given carbon price p (e.g., ﬁxed to a tax) proportional to the ratio of the abatement increment from innovation, AI,
to the default abatement, A0. The fact that b is normalized by the price takes into account the ﬁrms’ motivation to innovate,
which is proportional to p2 as in Eq. (4).
Remark 2. Two aspects of the information structure are important in standard models of innovation: private information
and information transmission via spillover or licensing. In some models, such as [8], there is a single innovating ﬁrm which
can extract rent from the other ﬁrms ex post. The fact that in our model the ﬁrms are continuously distributed limits the
market power each ﬁrm has. No ﬁrm can discretely beneﬁt at the expense of other ﬁrms using private information. Second,
we do not consider spillover in our model explicitly, as it can be effectively incorporated by suitable pre-conditioning of the
cost-type distribution (each ﬁrm can expect a certain increment in its cost type, depending on the ﬁrms’ investment in
innovation). Thus, whatever the precise nature of the spillover (e.g., in a regime with partial appropriability as in [12]), the
presence of spillover in our model would correspond to an increase of the innovation effectiveness b.14
Remark 3. If m and k (or sy) are ﬁxed, then the innovation effectiveness is proportional to 1/c, and can therefore be viewed
as a parameter that describes the cost of innovation. But the overall effectiveness of innovation to inﬂuence aggregate
emissions depends on the cost-type distribution. As is evident from Eq. (8), innovation effectiveness increases both in the
mean m and in the coefﬁcient of variation k. If c increases by a factor of a41, the innovation effectiveness decreases by a
factor of a, all else equal. Yet, if at the same time the average cost type m also increases by a factor of a due to an outside
shock that is not connected to the ﬁrms’ own innovative activity (but, e.g., to a direct technology transfer), then the
decrease in c and the decrease in m cancel each other, and b remains unchanged: the effectiveness of innovation depends
only on the ratio of m and c. A given cost c is less effective for innovation if ﬁrms are on average more efﬁcient (i.e., their
cost-type expectation goes up). A similar intuition applies when m stays constant, and the coefﬁcient of variation k
increases from zero to
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p 140. The resulting mean-preserving spread in the cost-type distribution increases the beneﬁts
of a unit of innovation in the aggregate, for a ﬁxed carbon price.1513 For m40, the relation between ðm,kÞ and ðm,syÞ is one-to-one, so that they are interchangeable.
14 Of course, this change in b would be endogenous, as for example with zero investment no innovation spillovers could be expected, so that b
remains unchanged. Endogenizing b would certainly make the model more complex, but not change the general insights obtained in the presence of any
positive b.
15 The expectation of the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁt, which is convex in y for a given carbon price p (cf. Eq. 5), increases when the cost-type distribution is
shifted to a second-order stochastically dominated distribution of the same mean [50].
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DðQ Þ ¼ dQ
2
2
,
where d denotes the slope of the marginal environmental damage curve.16 The expected environmental damages are
therefore
DðRÞ ¼ E½DðQ ð ~p, ~eÞÞjHð ~p, ~e,RÞ ¼ 0, ð9Þ
where the measure of the stochastic price ~p is determined by the market-clearing condition17
Hðp,e,RÞ  ðUpÞðpLÞðEQ ðp,eÞÞ ¼ 0: ð10Þ
Insofar as the regulatory policy R inﬂuences aggregate emissions, it also controls the level of expected environmental
damages. The expected aggregate cost of carbon abatement with the policy R is
C ðRÞ ¼ E½Cðeð ~p,ð1þyð ~p, ~yÞÞ ~yje0þ ~eÞ,ð1þyð ~p, ~yÞÞ ~yje0þ ~eÞjHð ~p, ~e,RÞ ¼ 0, ð11Þ
where the optimal emissions e* are given in Eq. (2) and optimal innovation is determined by Eq. (4). The ﬁrms’ expected
aggregate social cost of innovation K ðRÞ of the policy R is
K ðRÞ ¼ lE½Kðyð ~p, ~yÞÞjHð ~p, ~e,RÞ ¼ 0, ð12Þ
where the constant l 2 ½0,1 describes how much society (i.e., the regulator) cares about these costs. The reason why one
would expect generally that lo1 is that ﬁrms are able to appropriate a portion of the innovation payoffs in the form of
intellectual property rights (on top of the abatement-cost savings), resulting in private beneﬁts, e.g., through international
technology licensing or savings in future unmodelled periods, that offset the innovation cost to society at least in part.18
The regulatory problem: An optimal regulatory policy R* maximizes expected welfare W ðRÞ (or, equivalently, minimizes
total expected social cost SCðRÞ W ðRÞ),
W ðRÞ ¼C ðRÞDðRÞK ðRÞ, ð13Þ
i.e., it is such that
R 2 argmax
R2R
W ðRÞ:
3. Optimal regulation
Common regulatory schemes include pure carbon taxation, cap-and-trade markets without price controls, and cap-and-
trade markets with price controls as a generalization which includes the ﬁrst two. Here we examine all three regulatory
schemes. In doing this, we parametrize the ﬁrms’ innovation effectiveness by bZ0 and examine the effect of innovation as
b increases, in particular over the ‘base case’ without innovation (when b¼ 0). Such increases could come about
exogenously as a result of government sponsorship, or endogenously through ‘learning by doing’ with private investment
in R&D, which tends to generate further technological possibilities [15].
To compute the regulator’s objective function (expected total welfare W ), we ﬁrst determine the price pðe,RÞ of carbon
using the market-clearing condition (10) as a function of the macroeconomic shock e and the regulatory policy R=(E,L,U),
which yields
pðe,RÞ ¼
U if eZeðE,UÞ,
L if ereðE,LÞ,
Zp0ðe,EÞ otherwise,
8><
>: ð14Þ
where
p0ðe,EÞ ¼ ðe0þeEÞ=m ð15Þ
is the market price for carbon without innovation, and
eðE,UÞ ¼ mUð1þbU2Þðe0EÞ, ð16Þ
eðE,LÞ ¼ mLð1þbL2Þðe0EÞ ð17Þ16 A quadratic form for environmental damages in terms of pollution stocks (here: CO2 concentration) is widely used in the literature [2,21]. In our
model, there is only a single emissions period, such that for the purposes of determining the medium to long-term impact of regulation in moving the
emissions path, we use a quadratic damage function in emissions. Tol [57] provides additional justiﬁcation for why a quadratic form is useful in practice.
17 For the measure of ~p to be determined by the condition Hð ~p , ~e ,RÞ ¼ 0 it is, by the inverse function theorem, enough to assume that @Hðp,e,RÞ=@p
exists and is nonzero almost everywhere.
18 In addition, society may be able to obtain a ‘double dividend’ from the revenues generated by the sale of the carbon permits [3,4]. For simplicity,
we assume that the double dividend is zero.
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Eq. (14),
Z¼ 3 1þAþ 1
A
 1
2 ð0,1; ð18Þ
with A¼ ð1þð27b=2Þþ32
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
12bþ81b2
p
Þ1=3 and b¼ bp20, is decreasing in the innovation effectiveness b. When innovation
becomes prohibitively expensive (so that c-1), then b (or, equivalently, b) vanishes and consequently Z¼ 1.
Remark 4. It is possible to provide a simple a-priori estimate of the impact of innovation effectiveness on the market price
for carbon and the ﬁrms’ optimal innovation. From Eqs. (7), (10), and (15) we obtain that p0 ¼ pð1þbp2Þ, which is
equivalent to x3x2 ¼ bp20, where x¼ p0=pZ1 is the ratio of the market prices without innovation (for b¼ 0) to those with
innovation (for b40). Since x1rx3x2rx31 for all xZ1, we have
1
1þbp20
r p
p0
r 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þbp203
q r1 ð19Þ
for all bZ0. For example, when bp20 ¼ 7, the carbon price with innovation is between 1/8 and 1/2 of the carbon price
without innovation. As b-1, the relative price impact approaches 100%. Relation (19) together with the market-clearing
condition (as formulated in Eq. (23) below) also bounds the impact of innovation effectiveness on the optimal innovation
y* in Eq. (4),ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þbp20
q
1
1þk2 ry
r bp
2
0
1þk2 ,
where k is the coefﬁcient of variation in Eq. (8).
The expected social welfareW as a function of R in Eq. (13) is obtained by substituting the market price pðe,RÞ in Eqs. (9),
(11), and (12), leading to
C ðRÞ ¼ m
2
Z 1
1
ð1þbp2ðe,RÞÞp2ðe,RÞdGðeÞ, ð20Þ
DðRÞ ¼ d
2
Z 1
1
ðe0þempðe,RÞð1þbp2ðe,RÞÞÞ2 dGðeÞ, ð21Þ
K ðRÞ ¼ lm
4
Z 1
1
bp4ðe,RÞ dGðeÞ: ð22Þ
3.1. Pure taxation
Consider ﬁrst a restriction of feasible policies to impose a carbon tax tZ0, which is equivalent to making an unlimited
amount of allowances available at a ﬁxed price L¼U ¼ t. In that case, R¼ ð1,t,tÞ and pðe,RÞ  t.
Proposition 1 (Optimal tax). For any bZ0, let tðbÞ be the optimal carbon tax.(i) In the absence of innovation, i.e., when b¼ 0, the optimal tax is
tð0Þ ¼ de0
1þmd  t

0:
The optimal tax tðbÞ decreases (in a neighborhood of b40) if and only if(ii)
md4ð1lÞ=ð1þ3bt2Þ2jt ¼ tðbÞ:
For b-1, the optimal tax vanishes, i.e., it is tð1Þ ¼ 0.(iii)Part (i) implies that the optimal social welfare without innovation is
W

0,Tax ¼
mde20
1þmd
ds2e
2
:
Fig. 1. Optimal carbon tax as a function of b and d (for 0rlo1).
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or satisﬁed everywhere (in which case t0 is maximal), so that
tmax ¼
t0 if mdZ1l,ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
3bm
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1l
md
s
1
" #
þ
vuut otherwise,
8>><
>>:
it is imposed where b¼ bm  inffb^Z0 : mdZð1lÞ=ð1þ3b^t2Þ2jt ¼ tðb^Þg. The fact that the optimal carbon tax is (as long as
lo1) generally nonmonotonic in innovation effectiveness, as shown in Fig. 1, is noteworthy. It is obtained by providing a
condition on the model parameters for which the objective function W exhibits decreasing differences in ðt,bÞ.19
The constant l was introduced in Eq. (12) as a weight that describes the regulator’s concern with the aggregate cost of
innovation. For example, when l¼ 1 the regulator considers all of the cost to be societal, whereas when l¼ 0 the regulator
thinks of innovation expenditures as fully offset by private beneﬁts,20 so that they do not ﬁgure in social welfare. The value
1l is therefore the percentage of the aggregate innovation cost that society does not consider as lost because of the
compensating beneﬁts to social welfare. When the ﬁrms are fairly inefﬁcient at the outset (so that mo ð1lÞ=d), then the
tax level is increasing in b as long as the innovation effectiveness b does not exceed bm. Intuitively, increasing the tax level
contributes to increasing abatement through innovation, AI ¼ p2bA0. When b becomes large, i.e., b4bm, the tax level p
decreases in innovation effectiveness, because AI ¼ p2bA0 ¼ mp3b remains ﬁnite, so that necessarily p-0þ as b-1. If the
regulator considers all of the innovation cost as social cost (for l¼ 1), the optimal tax is decreasing in the innovation
effectiveness b.
Example 1. Consider an economy where the ﬁrms’ marginal cost types are distributed such that m¼ 33 106ðtCO2Þ2=$2,
sy ¼ 3:3 106ðtCO2Þ2=$2, the innovation-cost coefﬁcient is c¼ $100 109= (unit of relative improvement), and the
environmental damage function is characterized by d¼ $3:3 109=ðtCO2Þ2. Then for an annual aggregate BAU emissions
level of e0 ¼ 13:5 109tCO2, corresponding to the combined OECD emissions [23], we obtain that t0  $40:17=ðtCO2Þ.
Furthermore, with a resulting innovation effectiveness of b 0:167 103ðtCO2Þ2=$2, the optimal carbon tax (determined
numerically), tðbÞ  $45:61=ðtCO2Þ, increases by about 13% over its level without innovation, for l¼ 0. If the regulator
considers the innovation cost as social expenses, i.e., when l¼ 1, the optimal carbon tax drops to tðbÞ  $39:19=ðtCO2Þ.
The resulting expected aggregate emissions are Q

0  12:17 109tCO2 without innovation, and Q
ðbÞ  12:0 109tCO2 for
l¼ 0 (resp. Q ðbÞ  12:21 109tCO2 for l¼ 1) with innovation.
3.2. Basic cap-and-trade (without price controls)
We now consider the special case where the regulator chooses a ‘basic’ cap-and-trade scheme without binding price
bounds, by setting L=0 and U ¼1. Then the market price for carbon depends only on the emissions cap E and the realization
of the macroeconomic uncertainty e, i.e., p¼ pðe,EÞ ¼ Zp0ðe,EÞ. It is determined by the market-clearing condition (10), which19 For more intuition, see the discussion following Proposition 2 below.
20 Such private beneﬁts may accrue to an innovating ﬁrm through licensing [8].
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p0ðe,EÞpðe,EÞbp3ðe,EÞ ¼ 0: ð23Þ
Proposition 2 (Optimal emissions cap). For any bZ0, let EðbÞ be the optimal emissions cap in the absence of price
controls.(i) In the absence of innovation, i.e., when b¼ 0, the optimal emissions cap is
Eð0Þ ¼ e0
1þmd  E

0:
As the ﬁrms’ innovation effectiveness b increases, the optimal emissions cap EðbÞ decreases.(ii)
(iii) For b-1, the optimal emissions cap vanishes, i.e., Eð1Þ ¼ 0.In the absence of innovation, Eq. (15) and part (i) of Propositon 1 imply that the expected price is the same as the optimal
tax without innovation computed in the previous section,
p0 ¼ E½p0ð~e,E0ÞjE0 ¼ ðe0E0Þ=m¼ t0: ð24Þ
The corresponding optimal expected social welfare is
W

0,Basic C&T ¼
mde20
1þmd
s2e
2m :
Part (ii) of Proposition 2 characterizes the behavior of the solution in b. Since this paper contains several such monotone
comparative statics results, we provide the intuition underlying the proof. The proofs of other such results (cf. Propositions 1
(ii) and 4 (ii), (iii)) follow along similar lines. Via implicit differentiation of the market-clearing condition (23), we
obtain that pE,pbo0opbE (see Eqs. (26)–(28) in Appendix for the exact expressions), where subscripts denote partial
derivatives. That is, when the carbon market clears, the market price p decreases in the emissions cap E and innovation
effectiveness b, it also exhibits increasing differences in ðb,EÞ, which means that the price decrease in E (resp. b) is
moderated when b (resp. E) increases. Furthermore, since p is nonnegative and decreasing in both b and E, any (positive
integer) power of p also has increasing differences in ðb,EÞ. Using the previous relations, expected abatement cost C can
easily be shown to have increasing differences in ðb,EÞ, while D does not depend on b for a given emissions cap. Thus, the
expected social welfare W has decreasing differences in ðb,EÞ, so that the optimal E is decreasing in b. In other words, as
innovation becomes more effective (b increases), it is optimal to impose a more stringent emissions cap, i.e., EðbÞ is
decreasing in b (cf. Fig. 2).
Example 2. Using the same values for m, sy, c, d, and e0 as in Example 1, we obtain an optimal emissions cap of
E0  12:2 109tCO2. Because md 0:11o1, a carbon tax is superior to a pure emissions cap in terms of expected welfare.
Furthermore, with an innovation effectiveness of b 0:167 103ðtCO2Þ2=$2, and a uniform distribution of the
macroeconomic uncertainty on ½d,d (where d¼ ð10%Þ 	 e0), the optimal emissions cap EðbÞ  11:1 109tCO2 for l¼ 0Fig. 2. Optimal emissions cap as a function of b and d.
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3.2.1. Comparison between pure taxation and basic cap-and-trade
Price ﬂuctuations have a detrimental impact on social welfare compared to pure taxation if environmental
damages are small, i.e., when mdo1. Indeed, as shown by Weitzman [60], the difference in optimal expected welfare
levels
W

0,TaxW

0,Basic C&T ¼ ð1mdÞ
s2e
2m ;
favors a carbon tax over the basic cap-and-trade scheme if and only if mdo1, i.e., if and only if the slope of marginal
environmental damages is small compared to the (average) marginal abatement cost.21 With the introduction
of innovation, i.e., when b40, the scales gradually tip towards quantity-based regulation, no matter how environmental
damages behave. Let W

TaxðbÞ and W

Basic C&Tðb^Þ be the optimal welfare under a pure tax and an emissions cap,
respectively.
Proposition 3 (Pure taxation vs. basic cap-and-trade).(i)2
marAn increase in b increases the relative attractiveness of quantity-based regulation over pure taxation, i.e., there exists a b40
such that
0obo b^ob )W Basic C&TðbÞW

TaxðbÞoW

Basic C&Tðb^ÞW

Taxðb^Þ:
For large levels of innovation effectiveness, i.e., as b-1, quantity-based regulation strictly dominates pure taxation, so that(ii)
0¼W Basic C&Tð1Þ4W

Taxð1Þ ¼ds2e=2.With increasing innovation effectiveness abatement goes up and aggregate emissions tend to zero under either of the two
regulatory schemes. The intuition for part (i) of Proposition 3 is that while expected social welfare is increasing under both
regulatory policies, the increase is slower under pure taxation. With innovation ﬁrms perceive price uncertainty as
positive, because the upside to a higher price is a disproportionately larger beneﬁt from abating carbon and thus a higher
expected return on innovation (the technical reason being that ﬁrms’ payoffs are convex in the market price, which implies
a preference for increases in risk). In the extreme, a ﬁxed carbon tax does not respond to the macroeconomic uncertainty,
which leads to residual emissions (or overabatement) and therefore to positive environmental damages, whereas quantity-
regulation forces aggregate emissions to zero.
Remark 5. For any b, letW TaxðE;bÞ andW Basic C&Tðt;bÞ be the expected welfare under a pure tax and a basic cap-and-trade
scheme, respectively. The market-clearing condition (23) then implies that
max
EZ0
W Basic C&TðE;bÞ ¼max
tZ0
E½W Basic C&Tðe0þ ~emtð1þbt2Þ;bÞjt:
Similarly, the relation between price and aggregate emissions in Eq. (6) yields that
max
tZ0
W Taxðt;bÞ ¼max
EZ0
E½W Taxðpð~e,EÞ;bÞjE:
In other words, ﬁnding the optimal tax is equivalent to ﬁnding an emissions cap that maximizes the expected welfare
subject to market clearing (23), and ﬁnding the optimal emissions cap is the same as optimizing the expected welfare
subject to the output relation (6).
3.3. Cap-and-trade (with price controls)
Let us now consider the general case where the regulator can specify the cap-and-trade scheme R=(E,L,U) with price
controls. Clearly, this scheme cannot perform worse than any of the two regulatory policies considered above. The extant
theoretical literature has focussed on the effect of a price ceiling [30,48], which by Eqs. (20) and (21) reduces expected
aggregate costs, but at the same time tends to increase expected aggregate damages. The introduction of price ceilings
therefore tends to convert abatement-cost uncertainty into environmental-damage uncertainty. As a result it may be
optimal to increase or decrease the emissions cap, depending on how fast marginal environmental damages increase.
A price ﬂoor, on the other hand, tends to increase expected aggregate abatement costs and decrease expected aggregate
damages, and therefore produces a countervailing effect on the optimal emissions cap.1 Strictly speaking, the expected marginal cost
R
Yð1=yÞdFðyÞ, which may vary somewhat from 1=m, is relevant to the comparison with the slope of
ginal environmental damages d.
Price
Aggregate
Emissions
Macroeconomic
Uncertainty
Fig. 3. Cap-and-trade with price controls.
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less iIn the absence of innovation, i.e., when b¼ 0, the optimal regulatory policy is
R ¼ ðE0,L0,U0Þ ¼
e0
1þmd ,d 	 e0þE½~ej~er
e
1þmd ,d 	
e0þE½~ej~eZe
1þmd
 
,
where the optimal uncertainty thresholds e ¼ eðE0,U0Þ and e ¼ eðE0,L0Þ are given by Eqs. (16) and (17), respectively. For
parts (ii) and (iii), assume that the density of the macroeconomic uncertainty ~e is nondecreasing on its support.22(ii) With increasing innovation effectiveness b, the optimal emissions cap EðbÞ decreases.
(iii) With increasing innovation effectiveness b, the optimal price controls LðbÞ and UðbÞ tighten for small d and loosen for
large d.The workings of an optimal cap-and-trade market design with price controls as a function of the macroeconomic
uncertainty e and aggregate emissions Q are illustrated in Fig. 3. For b¼ 0 (i.e., without innovation), the optimal emissions
cap E*0 is unaffected by the optimal price controls and identical to the one determined earlier, in Section 3.2. The price
controls are symmetric to the marginal environmental damages dE0 if the distribution of macroeconomic uncertainty is
symmetrical. The width of the interval depends on the thickness of the tails of that distribution and on the magnitude of
the product md. The latter is also decisive in determining the tradeoff between pure taxation ðmdo1Þ and quantity-based
regulation ðmd41Þ, as analyzed before. With increases in md, not only does the regulator set a lower emissions cap, but
also price controls are loosened around dE*0. Part (ii) of the last result states that, all else being equal, innovation always
leads to a more stringent emissions target. In part (iii) of Proposition 4, it becomes evident that the evolution of the price
controls as a function of innovation effectiveness is somewhat more complicated. First, the price cap and price adjust to
changes of b in opposite directions, either tightening or widening the interval of admissible prices in the market for carbon
permits. Second, for small d price controls tighten with increasing b, i.e., LðbÞ increases and UðbÞ decreases. Third, for large
d, it is best for the regulator to respond to an increase in b by relaxing price controls, so that LðbÞ decreases and UðbÞ
increases. Combining the last two points, we see that the sensitivity of the optimal regulatory scheme to the magnitude of
the slope of marginal environmental damages d increases with increasing b (cf. Fig. 4). This makes sense and directly
corresponds to the classical tradeoff by Weitzman. But this time it is related to the regulatory response to innovation.
Depending on the magnitude of the environmental damages, an increase of innovation effectiveness may prompt a
regulator to impose more or less price control, a decision which becomes more sensitive to the magnitude of marginal
environmental damages.
Remark 6. Even for extremely large damage cost, the corresponding limits for the price bounds are well-deﬁned, as
limd-1U0 ¼ ðe0þE½~ej~eZeÞ=m and limd-1L0 ¼ ðe0þE½~ej~ereÞ=m.
Example 3. If the macroeconomic random shock ~e is uniformly distributed on ½d,d for some d40, then in the absence of
innovation the optimal carbon emissions cap is E0 ¼ e0=ð1þmdÞ, while the optimal price controls are
U0 ¼ dðe0=ð1þmdÞþd=ð2þmdÞÞ and L0 ¼ dðe0=ð1þmdÞd=ð2þmdÞÞ. Using the same values for m,sy,c,d, e0, and l as in
Example 1 and 2, in the absence of innovation we obtain an optimal emissions cap E0  12:2 109tCO2 (as in Example 2)This condition is simple and sufﬁcient; it is satisﬁed, e.g., for a uniform distribution of the macroeconomic uncertainty on a compact support. Much
s required, as can be seen by inspecting the proof of Proposition 4.
Fig. 4. Price controls as a function of innovation effectiveness b (for d small/large).
Fig. 5. Complementarity relationships in social welfare, W ¼CDK .
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2
,
and with d¼ ð10%Þ  e0 as in Example 2, the optimal emissions cap becomes EðbÞ  11:5 109tCO2 with the loosened
price control ðLðbÞ,UðbÞÞ  ð42:8,48:6Þ$=tCO2, for l¼ 0 (resp. EðbÞ  11:9 109tCO2 and ðLðbÞ,UðbÞÞ  ð37:2,41:3Þ$=tCO2
for l¼ 1).3.3.1. Comparative statics for policy adjustments
It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that a political process can produce optimal values for all components of a regulatory
policy, so that R*=(E*, L*,U*) is actually implemented. More likely is a scenario under which a political debate is informed
by the model solution but one or more elements of the resulting compromise are moved away from the model-predicted
normative outcome, e.g., because they satisfy the special interests of certain stakeholders. This implies the natural question
of how the remaining components should be adjusted so as to achieve the ‘constrained optimality’ of the free elements.
The proof of the last parts of Proposition 4 helps answer questions of the sort, ‘what happens to the optimal price ﬂoor and
the optimal emissions cap when the price ceiling is changed?’ The latter adjustment may be needed for political reasons or
for achieving harmonization between different cap-and-trade schemes in neighboring countries, despite the prima facie
welfare losses in a single country.
As pointed out by Milgrom and Roberts [31], based on earlier ﬁndings by Topkis [58], among others, the monotonicity of
optimal decisions (on lattices) critically depends on the supermodularity properties of the objective function in the
decision variables and parameters.23 In case supermodularity does not obtain under the initial problem parametrization,
one may use an appropriate parameter (or variable) transformation [56]. Such a transformation turns out to be very simple,
as several sign reversals are enough to establish supermodularity of each of the components (C ,D, and K ) of the
expected social welfare W .
The complementarity relationships between the decision variables and innovation effectiveness as well as marginal
environmental damage, as determined by the sign of the cross-partial derivatives, are summarized by the diagrams in
Fig. 5. We see that both C and K are supermodular (have positive cross-partial derivatives) in ðE,L,U,bÞ, whereas D
is supermodular in (E,L,U,D). Thus, when expected damages dominate in the social welfare, i.e., when d is large, then
monotone comparative statics obtain according to the complementarity properties of D. When d is small, then the
complementarity properties of C determine the comparative statics. Fig. 5 is also useful for determining the direction of
adjustments to the remaining policy instruments when one of them is changed exogenously. For example, when the price
ceiling U is increased and the slope of marginal environmental damage cost d is fairly large, then the optimal emissions cap
decreases (opposite direction as change in price cap, for the relation between E and U in D has a positive sign, as23 Milgrom and Shannon [32] show that quasi-supermodularity of the objective function is a sufﬁcient (and in some sense necessary) condition for
the monotonicity of solutions in parameters.
Fig. 6. Expected market price pðbÞ as a function of innovation effectiveness b.
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optimal price ﬂoor increases (opposite direction compared to change in price cap, as the relation between E and L in D has
a positive sign).4. Policy implications
A substantial private investment is needed to signiﬁcantly reduce carbon emissions into the atmosphere. Effective
regulatory schemes therefore need to take into account not only the ﬁrms’ emissions decisions, but also the return on their
R&D investments. A price ﬂoor guarantees a minimum return on innovation, whereas a price cap reduces the volatility in
aggregate abatement costs. The last section has shown that changes in the ﬁrms’ propensity to innovate are likely to have a
profound impact on the optimal design of carbon taxes as well as on cap-and-trade markets, with or without price controls.
It has also made clear that a higher innovation effectiveness tends to increase the attractiveness of cap-and-trade schemes
vs. carbon taxes. This is due to the fact that when prices increase (cf. Fig. 6), the substitution of emissions uncertainty for
price uncertainty by imposing a tighter quantity control serves as an additional innovation incentive, while when prices
decrease, the savings in abatement cost become so large that the regulator’s only worry is the uncertainty in
environmental damages, thus calling for a quantity control.
The introduction of price controls in cap-and-trade markets, while superior to basic cap-and-trade in a simpliﬁed
modelling framework, is subject to a number of political considerations. First, the determination of a price cap in a political
process is likely to lead to substantial inﬂuence activities by affected parties during the course of the legislative process,
which may therefore produce price caps that are too low or price ﬂoors that are too high as a result of ‘political
compromises.’ Second, environmental damages depend on aggregate carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions
irrespective of their origin. This implies the need for a coordinated response and therefore government intervention, and
international cooperation. If emissions targets are coordination devices for international cooperation, then policy
mechanisms (e.g., cap-and-trade schemes without price ceilings) can enhance the ability of governments to comply with
commitments to future generations and investors in low-carbon alternatives. A negative side-effect of price controls may
be that they create challenges for the harmonization of cap-and-trade schemes with different price controls, and may even
lead to arbitrage opportunities in cross-border trade of emissions permits.
Given the above caveats, what are the potential beneﬁts of additional price controls?24 Price caps reduce expected
aggregate costs as well as the social cost of innovation, as can be seen directly from Eqs. (20) and (22). At the same time
they tend to increase expected environmental damages. Decreasing an existing price cap decreases the optimal emissions
cap, as long as d is small. For large d, the opposite holds true. Thus, the degree to which a more stringent policy can be
pursued by introducing a price cap depends on the relative magnitude of the slope of environmental damage cost. Price
ﬂoors, on the other hand, offer a government-backed minimum value for emissions permits. This encourages innovation.
Price ﬂoors reduce the downside risk from low carbon prices for investors in new abatement technologies. As investors
tend to be risk-averse and concerned particularly with such downside risks, price ﬂoors can help justify the pursuit of
‘low-carbon projects.’24 Indirect methods of ‘price stabilization,’ for example through the use of buffer stocks, were suggested in great detail by Newbery and Stiglitz [37].
In this spirit, it may be possible to relax direct price controls if one allows for emissions banking to create buffers moderating price ﬂuctuations that
would otherwise result from the shocks in BAU emissions levels driven by macroeconomic uncertainty. A multi-period emissions-trading framework is
needed to address this question.
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In the absence of innovation, the classical Weitzman [60] result states that under uncertainty the relative magnitude of
the slopes of marginal abatement costs and marginal environmental damage costs is crucial for deciding between
tax-based or quantity-based policy instruments. When the slope of marginal environmental damage cost d is larger than
the slope of (expected) marginal abatement costs 1=m, quantity-based regulation is preferable. The best instrument
attempts to parallel marginal welfare as a function of the uncertainty. Weitzman’s classical framework allows only for one
degree of freedom, either the choice of the emissions cap or the choice of the carbon price. Introducing additional degrees
of freedom through price controls in a cap-and-trade market allows one ﬁrst to replicate each of the two simple schemes
and then to improve welfare over both schemes.
We assume that ﬁrms can invest in innovation and thus reduce the cost of mitigation efforts. This enables them to
mitigate more carbon at the same price of carbon. With additional mitigation opportunities the marginal abatement
cost is reduced. This shifts the tradeoff between marginal abatement cost and marginal environmental damage cost.
The optimal emissions cap decreases in innovation effectiveness. In the presence of innovation we observe two additional
results. First, carbon prices create incentives for innovation in mitigation technologies. A welfare-optimal carbon
policy targets an emissions level at which the innovation-enhanced marginal mitigation cost curve (considering
expected innovation) intersects the damage curve that includes the additional beneﬁts from incentives for innovation.
As a result, the optimal carbon price in the world with innovation can be higher than in the world without
innovation. Second, the model shows that with increasing innovation, price controls are tightened when marginal
environmental damage costs are low, and relaxed when these costs are large. Innovation creates mitigation opportunities
that reduce the slope of the mitigation cost curve and therefore make the optimal instrument look more like a cap (e.g.,
wider spreads).
In the current discussion on price caps and ﬂoors, the analysis often focuses on static models. Including additional
dimensions can materially alter the results. For example, the potential for innovation can increase the level at which caps
and ﬂoors are set. We note that the analysis in this paper neglected several global effects of price caps, such as the question
of what happens when they are set in a world of uncertain fuel and technology prices. The political debate surrounding
price controls as additional policy instruments is complex. For example, Pizer [48], among others, pointed out that price
caps can increase the likelihood of governments accepting more stringent targets. On the other hand, price caps, through
implicit borrowing from future periods, may reduce the incentive for governments or private companies to comply with
emissions targets and can subsequently create incentives to default on long-term emissions targets that would require
repayment of carbon debt. More elaborate models are required to examine such effects in greater detail.Acknowledgments
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Cambridge.Appendix A. ProofsProof of Proposition 1. (i) Let R¼ ðe0,t,tÞ. The corresponding expected social welfare,
W ðt;bÞ ¼ m
2
ð1þbt2Þt2 d
2
½s2e þðe0mtð1þbt2ÞÞ2l
mbt4
4
,
is strictly concave in the tax level t. In the absence of innovation it is b¼ 0, so that
W ðt;0Þ ¼ mt
2
2
 d
2
½s2e þðe0mtÞ2,
and the unique optimal tax becomes t0 ¼ de0=ð1þmdÞ. (ii) For b40, the optimal tax tðbÞ is determined by the ﬁrst-order
necessary optimality condition W tðtðbÞ;bÞ ¼ 0.25 Differentiating this condition implicitly with respect to b yields
dtðbÞ=db¼W tbðtðbÞ;bÞ=W ttðtðbÞ;bÞ. SinceW ttðtðbÞ;bÞo0 at the welfare-maximizing tax level, the optimal tax tðbÞ
is decreasing if and only if W tbðtðbÞ;bÞo0. CombiningW tbðt;bÞ ¼ mt3½ð3de0=tÞ2ð1þmdð2þ3bt2ÞÞþl with the fact that25 By Abel’s impossibility theorem (see, e.g., [22], p. 308) a closed-form solution for t*ðbÞ cannot be expected.
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de0
t
¼ 1þð2þlÞbt
2þmdð1þbt2Þð1þ3bt2Þ
1þ3bt2 ,
we obtain that W tbo0 if and only if md4 ð1lÞ=ð1þ3bt2Þ2. (iii) Since limb-1W tðt;bÞ=b2 ¼3m2dt5 ¼ 0 at the
optimal tax t¼ tð1Þ, we must have that tð1Þ ¼ 0, i.e., the optimal tax converges to zero as perfect abatement
becomes free. &
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Let R¼ ðE,0,1Þ. The expected social welfare in this case is
W ðE;bÞ ¼E m
2
ð1þbp2ð~e,EÞÞp2ð~e,EÞþ dE
2
2
þ lmbp
4ð~e,EÞ
4
" #
,
where pðe,EÞ ¼ Zp0ðe,EÞ as in Eq. (14). In the absence of innovation, i.e., for b¼ 0, it is
W ðE;0Þ ¼ ðe0EÞ
2
2m
 dE
2
2
 s
2
e
2m
,
strictly concave in E, leading to a unique optimal emissions cap of E0 ¼ e0=ð1þmdÞ. (ii) For b40, the optimal emissions cap
EðbÞ is implicitly determined by the ﬁrst-order necessary optimality condition
WEðEðbÞ,bÞ ¼ 0: ð25Þ
Differentiating Eq. (25) on both sides with respect to b, we obtain that
dEðbÞ
db
¼WEbðE
ðbÞ;bÞ
WEEðEðbÞ;bÞ
:
By differentiating the market-clearing condition (23) it is
pE ¼
1
m
1
1þ3bp2 , ð26Þ
pb ¼
p3
1þ3bp2 , ð27Þ
pEb ¼
3p2
m
1þbp2
ð1þ3bp2Þ3
, ð28Þ
so that
WEbðEðbÞ;bÞ ¼ mE½ðlþ2mÞðp3þ3bp2pbÞpEðlþ2mÞbp3pEbpbpEppEb ¼ E
ð43bp2þð2mþlÞð1b2p4ÞÞp3
mð1þ3bp2Þ3
" #
o0,
for all l 2 ½0,1 and all m40 (with p¼ pð~e,EðbÞÞ). SinceWEEðEðbÞ;bÞo0 at the welfare-maximizing emissions cap, the fact
that WEbo0 implies that the optimal emissions cap EðbÞ is decreasing. (iii) Note ﬁrst that pð1Þ ¼ 0, i.e., the market price
for carbon vanishes for b-1, which is obtained by taking the corresponding limit in the market-clearing condition (23).
Thus, taking the limit in the ﬁrst-order condition (25) implies that Eð1Þ ¼ 0. &
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Given any b40, letW Taxðt;bÞ andW Basic C&TðE;bÞ be the expected welfare for a pure tax of t and
an emissions cap of E, respectively. At the optimal levels tðbÞ and EðbÞ, an application of the envelope theorem yields that
d
db
ðW TaxðbÞW

Basic C&TðbÞÞ ¼
m
2
1 l
2
  1þ 2þl
2l
 
bt2
 
t4
1þ3bt2

t ¼ tðbÞ
0
BBB@ E
1þ 2þl
2l
 
b ~p2
 
~p4
1þ3b ~p2

~p ¼ pð~e,EðbÞÞ
2
664
3
775
1
CCA,
whereW

TaxðbÞ ¼W TaxðtðbÞ;bÞ,W

Basic C&TðbÞ ¼W Basic C&TðEðbÞ;bÞ, and pð~e,EðbÞÞ ¼ Zp0ð~e,EðbÞÞ as in Eq. (14). Taking the limit
for b-0þ on both sides of the last equation, we obtain
d
db

b ¼ 0
ðW TaxðbÞW

Basic C&TðbÞÞ ¼
m
2
1 l
2
 
ððt0Þ4E½ðp0ð~e,E0ÞÞ4Þo0,
since t0 ¼ E½p0ð~e,E0Þ by Eq. (24), and E½p0ð~e,E0ÞoE½ðp0ð~e,E0ÞÞ4 by Jensen’s inequality (as long as there exists nontrivial
macroeconomic uncertainty ~e, so that se40). From the continuity of the derivative ofW

TaxðbÞW

Basic C&TðbÞ we can therefore
conclude that there exists a b040, such that d=dbðW

TaxðbÞW

Basic C&TðbÞÞo0 for all b 2 ð0,b0Þ. (ii) By taking the limit for
b-1 in Eq. (18) we obtain that limb-1Z¼ 0 for any positive p0. Hence, Eq. (14) implies that
limb-1pðe,EðbÞÞ ¼ limb-1Zp0ðe,EðbÞÞ ¼ 0 for all e. Thus, using part (iii) of Proposition 2 together with Eq. (15) and the
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lim
b-1
bðpðe,EðbÞÞÞ4 ¼ lim
b-1
bðpðe,EðbÞÞÞ3
 
lim
b-1
pðe,EðbÞÞ
 
¼ 0,
which implies (after a legitimate switch of limit and integration) in Eqs. (20)–(22) (for R¼ ðEðbÞ,0,1Þ) that
limb-1W

Basic C&TðbÞ ¼ 0. On the other hand, by part (iii) of Proposition 1 it is tð1Þ ¼ 0, so that, using Eqs. (20)
and (22), the social costs of innovation and aggregate abatement costs are zero. The key difference of pure taxation is that as
innovation effectiveness goes to inﬁnity, the (deterministic!) optimal tax level approaches zero, and at the same time the
aggregate abatement approaches e0, so that, using Eqs. (6) and (8), the aggregate emissions become
lim
b-1
Q ðtðbÞ,eÞ ¼ lim
b-1
ðe0þemtðbÞð1þbðtðbÞÞ2ÞÞ ¼ e
for all e. Expected aggregate environmental damages are therefore equal to ds2e=2, so that
lim
b-1
W

TaxðbÞ ¼ 
ds2e
2
o0¼ lim
b-1
W

Basic C&TðbÞ,
which concludes our proof. &
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) We ﬁrst consider the situation without innovation, where b¼ 0 and where W ðR;0Þ is the
expected social welfare without innovation. Using the Leibniz rule, we obtain the ﬁrst-order necessary optimality
condition
@W ðR;0Þ
@E
¼
Z e
e
1
m ðe0þeEÞdE
 
dGðeÞ ¼ 0,
which is equivalent to E0 ¼ ðe0þE½~ejer ~ereÞ=ð1þmdÞ. Similarly, we obtain
@W ðR;0Þ
@U
¼
Z 1
e
ðmUþmdðe0þemUÞÞdGðeÞ ¼ 0,
which is equivalent to U0 ¼ d 	 ðe0þE½~ej~eZeÞ=ð1þmdÞ, and, analogously, L0 ¼ d 	 ðe0þE½~ej~ereÞ=ð1þmdÞ. (ii), (iii) We
examine the supermodularity properties of the expected welfare W ¼CDK for each of its components. Consider ﬁrst
C ðR;bÞ ¼ m
2
Z 1
1
ð1þbp2ðe,RÞÞp2ðe,RÞdGðeÞ
with
CbðR;bÞ ¼
m
2
Z e
e
ð2ð1þ2bp2Þppbþp4ÞdGðeÞ,
where pb is given in Eq. (27). Using Eqs. (26)–(28), we therefore ﬁnd that
CbL ¼
m2
2
ð1þbL2ÞL4G0ðeÞr0r m
2
2
ð1þbU2ÞU4G0ðeÞ ¼ CbU ,
and
CbE ¼ 2
Z e
e
ð1þ3bp2þ3b2p4Þp3
ð1þ3bp2Þ3
dGðeÞþ m
2
ð1þbU2ÞU4G0ðeÞ
1þ3bU2 ð1þbL
2ÞL4G0ð eÞ
1þ3bL2
 
:
Since, by hypothesis, the density G0ðeÞ is nondecreasing on its support, it is G0ðeÞrG0ðeÞ. Furthermore, it is easy to show that
the function x4ð1þbx2Þ=ð1þ3bx2Þ is strictly increasing in x40, so that indeed CbEZ0. In addition, CLU ¼ 0, and
CEU ¼mUð1þ2bU2ÞG0ðeÞr0rmLð1þ2bL2ÞG0ðeÞ ¼ CEL,
which implies that C is submodular in ðE,L,U,bÞ. Consider now
K ðR;bÞ ¼ lmb
4
Z 1
1
p4 dGðeÞ,
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K bðR;bÞ ¼
lm
4
Z 1
1
p4 dGðeÞþlmb
Z e
e
p3pb dGðeÞ:
Using Eqs. (26)–(28), it is therefore
K bU ¼
lmbU6G0ðeÞ
1þ3bU2 r0rlmbL
6G0ð eÞ
1þ3bL2 ¼ K bL,
and
K bE ¼l
Z e
e
ð13b2p4Þp3
ð1þ3bp2Þ3
dGðeÞþmb U
3G0ðeÞ
1þ3bU2L
3G0ð eÞ
1þ3bL2
  !
r0,
as long as b is small. In addition, KLU ¼ KEL ¼ KEU ¼ 0, so that we have shown that K is submodular in ðE,L,U,bÞ. Lastly,
consider
DðR;bÞ ¼ d
2
Z e
e
E2 dGðeÞþ d
2
Z e
1
ðe0þemLð1þbL2ÞÞ2 dGðeÞþ
d
2
Z 1
e
ðe0þemUð1þbU2ÞÞ2 dGðeÞ,
whence
DbðR;bÞ ¼md L3
Z e
1
ðe0þemLð1þbL2ÞÞdGðeÞ

þU3
Z 1
e
ðe0þemUð1þbU2ÞÞdGðeÞ

,
¼md L3
Z e
1
ðEþeeÞdGðeÞþU3
Z 1
e
ðEþeeÞdGðeÞ
 
:
Thus, we ﬁnd
DbL ¼ mdð1GðeÞÞL2½3ðEþE½~ej~ereeÞmLð1þ3bL2Þð1þEG0ðeÞÞZ0,
DbU ¼mdð1GðeÞÞU2½3ðEþE½~ej~eZeeÞmUð1þ3bU2Þð1þEG0ðeÞÞr0,
DbE ¼ md½U3G0ðeÞL3G0ðeÞZ0:
Moreover, DLU ¼ 0, and DEL ¼dEG0ðeÞr0rdEG0ðeÞ ¼DEU , which, together with the previous inequalities, implies that D is
submodular in ðE,L,U,bÞ. Hence, for small damages W is supermodular in ðE,L,U,bÞ, and for large damages W
is supermodular in ðE,L,U,bÞ. First, this implies that EðbÞ is decreasing. Second, for small environmental damages, LðbÞ
is increasing and UðbÞ is decreasing (i.e., more stringent price control). Third, for high environmental damages, LðbÞ is
decreasing and UðbÞ is increasing (i.e., less stringent price control). &
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